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8 (QODUJHPHQWDQGWKH(&¶VHYROYLQJGHPRFUDWLFLGHQWLW\
1962±19781 
 Emma De Angelis & Eirini Karamouzi  
 
Abstract 
Building on multiple archival sources, the chapter traces how the Community 
institutions legitimized the expansion and continuation of the process of European 
integration through the discursive construction of democracy. It will focus on the 
entangled exchanges and debates elicited by the attempts of Southern European 
countries to accede to the EEC in the 1960-VWKHUHEXWWDORI6SDLQ¶VLQLWLDORYHUWXUHV
in 1962, the challenge of Greece ± WKH&RPPXQLW\¶VILUVW$VVRFLDWHPHPEHU± being 
taken over by a military dictatorship in 1967, and finally the democratizing of Greece, 
Spain and Portugal after the fall of their respective dictatorships in the 1970s. 
 
The financial crises lasting from 2008, the immigration crises caused by the Syrian 
Civil War, and the Brexit referendum have brought controversy in European politics 
about the ultimate meaning and goals of the European Union (EU). Throughout the 
twenty-eight Member States, politicians on every point of the political spectrum, from 
the staunchly Eurosceptic to the fiercely pro-European, have engaged in conversations 
about the nature and identity of the European beast, no matter the specifics of the 
domestic problems that in most cases framed the national debates. They scrutinize the 
political principles that sit at the heart of the EUWKH8QLRQ¶VGHPRFUDWLFcredentials, 
its legitimacy, and its ability to serve the FLWL]HQV¶ interests and respond to their 
demands in a more effective way than the nation-states alone.  
At such critical junctures, it is vital to ensure that the debate does not lose sight 
of the wider historical context, which reveals that questions of democracy, legitimacy, 
and shared values have existed ever since the genesis of the European Community 
(EC)2 ± they are far from novel.3 The questions have been particularly acute every time 
D QHZ DVSLULQJ 0HPEHU 6WDWH ORGJHG LWV DSSOLFDWLRQ WR HQWHU µ(XURSH¶4 Ever since 
%ULWDLQ¶VLOO-fated application in 1961, the question of enlargement has been intrinsically 
linked to the question of European identity: deciding which countries had the right to 
become members of the EC/EU, and on what basis, played a crucial role in the 
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HPHUJHQFHDQGHYROXWLRQRIWKHH[LVWLQJRUJDQL]DWLRQ¶VLGHQWLW\5  
This chapter seeks to unravel a specific ± and crucial ± aspect of this process, 
as it asks how key political and institutional actors involved in the enlargement of the 
Community to Southern European countries in the 1980s defined the democratic 
HOHPHQWVXQGHUSLQQLQJWKH(8¶VSROLWLFDOYDOXHVLQWKH-70s, and how EC actors ± 
the Council of Ministers, the European Commission, and the European Parliament (EP) 
± GHILQHGDJHQHUDOFRQFHSWRIµEHLQJ(XURSHDQ¶IRUWKHVSHFLILFSXUSRVHVRIMRLQLQJWKH
Community. It does so by focusing in particular on how and when democracy entered 
the discursive politics of the Community to finally become one of the fundamental 
tenets of the European self-image - and in the process influenced how decision-makers 
approached the question of enlargement. It will focus on the debates elicited by the 
attempts of Southern European countries to accede to the EEC in the 1960s and 1970s: 
WKH UHEXWWDO RI 6SDLQ¶V LQLWLDO RYHUWXUHV LQ  WKH FKDOOHQJH RI *UHHFH ± the 
&RPPXQLW\¶VILUVW$VVRFLDWHPHPEHU± being taken over by a military dictatorship in 
1967, and the difficulties of dealing with the democratizing of Greece, Spain, and 
Portugal after the fall of their respective dictatorships in the 1970s.6 Finally, it will 
analyse how these ideas were formalised in the Declaration on Democracy issued in 
1978.7  
The analysis of newly released documents of major Member States and EC 
institutions and of the untapped source of the public debates of the European Parliament 
shows how the EC actors slowly ± and at times grudgingly ± used the idea of democracy 
to legitimize the expansion and continuation of European integration. From being 
discussed in the EP in the 1960s, the idea slowly percolated through to the policy-
makers, influencing their response to the requests presented by newly democratic 
Southern European states in the 1970s. At the same times, the analysis shows that the 
FRQVWUXFWLRQRI D(XURSHDQ LGHQWLW\ FHQWUHGDURXQG WKHFRQFHSWRI µGHPRFUDF\¶ZDV
something that emerged both from internal processes within the Community and in the 
meeting with new applicants in a specific historical setting ± applicants that demanded 
and envisioned membership in the EC as a path to democratic restoration. It is in the 
G\QDPLFVRIWKHVHµHQWDQJOHGH[FKDQJHV¶WKDWDPRUHQXDQFHGIXOOHUXQGHUVWDQGLQJRI
hRZ HQODUJHPHQW SURFHVVHV DQG WKH (&(8¶V SROLWLFDO LGHQWLW\ IHG RQ HDFK RWKHU
emerges. 
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 Political scientists have already claimed that the debates articulated around the 
question of enlargement gradually shaped a political identity based on the idea of 
demRFUDF\ZKLFKKDGQRWRULJLQDOO\EHHQSDUWRIWKH(&¶VVHOI-image. For instance, 
'DQLHO7KRPDV¶VDQDO\VLVRIWKHUHDFWLRQWR6SDLQ¶VELGIRUDVVRFLDWLRQLQVXJJHVWV
that the identification of Europe as a promoter of fundamental democratic principles 
dLGQRWVWDUWZLWKWKHµGUDIWLQJRIDWUHDW\RUWKHFUDIWLQJRIDFRXUWRSLQLRQ¶EXWZDV
gradually and commonly articulated through the enlargement process.8 Frank 
6FKLPPHOIHQQLJXVHVWKHLGHDRIµUKHWRULFDOHQWUDSPHQW¶WRGHVFULEHWKHZD\LQZKLFK
the norms, values and collective identity constructed through discourse can be used 
strategically by political actors to advance their interest.9 Ulrich Sedelmeier reprised 
WKLVDQDO\VLVLQKLVZRUNRQWKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQ¶V(DVWHUQ(QODUJHPHQW10 Thomas Diez 
goes even further, arguing in his analysis of language in the construction of the 
European Union that the terms used to describe the EU by politicians and academics 
alike are not merely descriptive, but influenced the way in which the EU developed in 
the first place.11 There is therefore a general consensus in political science and 
European studies on the relevance of discourse in understanding ideas of Europe and 
European identity that exist within the European political arena12. However, so far no 
thorough historical examination of this claim based on the scrutiny of primary sources 
has been put forward. It is only through a historical approach that it is possible to 
understand how this discourse emerged, was articulated, and adapted over time as the 
(&¶VSROLWLFDO and institutional actors sought to shape their policy towards applicant 
states. Full access to archival material for this period means that it is now possible to 
trace the nuances of how the discourse was initiated and shaped in the meeting between 
the EC and potential southern Member States, different public and private fora, in open 
discussions in the EP and closed-door meetings at Commission and Council level, and 
in the public practice of each institution and the Community as a whole. 
 
The EP introduces the idea: the Birkelbach Report 
Democracy was not always a dominant feature of European political discourse. The 
SUHDPEOHRIWKH7UHDWLHVRI5RPHPDNHVJHQHUDOUHIHUHQFHVWRµOLEHUW\¶DQGDUWLFOH
VWDWHVWKDWDQ\(XURSHDQQDWLRQµPD\DSSO\WREHFRPHD PHPEHURIWKH&RPPXQLW\¶
but nowhere in the original Treaties did the Six make democracy a prerequisite for 
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membership or even quote it as one of the fundamental values underpinning the 
PRYHPHQW WRZDUGV µFORVHU XQLRQ¶13 In fact, Daniel Thomas has claimed that the 
omission of democracy and human rights from the Treaties was a deliberate shift away 
IURP WKH µFRQVWLWXWLRQDOLVDWLRQ RI GHPRFUDF\ DQG KXPDQ ULJKWV¶ IRXQG LQ SUHYLRXV
treaties such as the 1948 Brussels Treaty or the 1949 Statute of the CoE.14 Rather than 
being an original tenet of the European construction, democracy was slowly introduced 
and built into the core political value of European identity over more than two decades. 
7KHLQLWLDOLPSHWXVIRUZKDWZRXOGEHFRPHWKH&RPPXQLW\¶VSROLWLFDOidentity 
GLVFRXUVHFDPHLQZLWKWKH(XURSHDQ3DUOLDPHQW¶VUHVSRQVHWR6SDLQ¶VRYHUWXUHV
towards, and open interest in associating itself with the EC in order to become a 
member. In fact, when the UK first applied the previous year, nobody would have 
thought to question its democratic credentials, any other objections notwithstanding. 
Spain, on the other hand, was still in the grips of the Francoist regime and was not even 
a member of the CoE. The possibility of an application led German MEP Willy 
Birkelbach, a member of the socialist group, to draft a Report on the political and 
LQVWLWXWLRQDO DVSHFWV RI DFFHVVLRQ µDGKpVLRQ¶ RU DVVRFLDWLRQ ZLWK WKH&RPPXQLW\15 
Based on the work undertaken by the Political Affairs Committee between November 
and December 1961, the now well-known Birkelbach Report formed the basis of the 
first general debate on the principles of enlargement held by the European Parliament.  
The report put forward an interpretation of the Treaty of Rome according to 
which states wishing to join would have to fulfil certain conditions, and affirmed the 
(3¶VLQWHQWLRQWRHQJDJHLQWKHGHILQLWLRQRIWKHSROLWLFDODQGLQVWLWXWLRQDODVSHFWVRI
accession in general terms: the stated aim was not to pass judgment on the specificities 
on any particular membership application, but to establish the general principles under 
which an accession should take place. In addressing the political conditions for 
eligibility, the report asserted that the political regime of an applicant state should 
ensure that thHQHZVWDWHZRXOGQRWEHD µFRUSVpWUDQJHU¶DPRQJ WKHH[LVWLQJVWDWHV
ZKLFK WKH GRFXPHQW H[SODLQHG DV WKH µJXDUDQWHH RI WKH H[LVWHQFH RI D IRUP RI
GHPRFUDWLFVWDWH¶ as a condition for accession.16 
 It defined this democratic state as a state in which governments enjoy 
democratic legitimation and the people take part in decision-making either directly or 
through directly elected representatives.17 It also stated that applicant states should be 
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required to recognise the principles indicated by the CoE as a condition for 
membership, especially the rule of law, human rights, and fundamental freedoms (art. 
3 of the Statute of the Council of Europe).18 In presenting the report to the EP, 
%LUNHOEDFK DIILUPHG WKH GHVLUH WR HVWDEOLVK JXLGHOLQHV µOLJQHV GLUHFWULFHV¶ IRU
accession and association. He highlighted the fact that democracy, in the form of the 
respect of fundamental rights and freedoms, was to be considered an essential 
requirement for Community membership.19 The same ideas were expressed by his 
colleagues in the ensuing parliamentary debate.20 In January 1962, the EP was a largely 
symbolic institution and would have had no formal role in any enlargement process. Its 
members, however, were seeking ways to carve out a role for their institution within 
the Community framework. The prospect of a membership request from a country that 
did not share the democratic make-XSRIWKH(&¶VH[LVWLQJ0HPEHU6WDWHs proved the 
ideal opportunity for the EP to both define the EC as a political actor and to highlight 
the concept of democracy as its fundamental value. The debate surrounding the 
Birkelbach report, albeit hypothetical at this stage, was thus significant for introducing 
three concepts: that the EC had a political identity; that this identity was based on the 
democratic principle, as respected by its existing Member States; and that any state 
wishing to join should adhere to the same principle in order to be eligible. Over the 
following two decades, these ideas would be honed by the European Parliament and, 
increasingly, the Commission and the Council, as they defined the terms of the 
expansion of the EC to new Member States.  
$VFDQWPRQWKDIWHU WKH(3¶VDSSroval of the Birkelbach report, in February 
1962, the Spanish government made a formal request for talks,21 with the clear intention 
of negotiating association and eventual integration into the Community.22 %LUNHOEDFK¶V
reaction was immediate. On behalf of the socialist group in the EP, he posed the first 
oral question to the Council ever asked by a representative of the parliament, asking 
whether the Council and the Commission would find it appropriate to consider such an 
application, coming from a country wKRVH µSROLWLFDO SKLORVRSK\¶ ZDV LQ FRPSOHWH
RSSRVLWLRQWRWKHµFRQFHSWLRQVDQGVWUXFWXUHV¶RIWKH(&+HWKHQTXRWHGWKHUHIHUHQFH
WRµIUHHGRP¶LQWKH3UHDPEOHRIWKH5RPH7UHDWLHVDQGOLQNHGLWGLUHFWO\ZLWKKXPDQ
rights and fundamental democratic liberties, giving an interpretation based on the 
values shared by the Six and that it would be hard for them to reject. He was explicitly 
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espousing the interpretation of these words that had already been given by trade unions 
DFURVV WKH 6L[ ZKR HPSKDVLVHG WKH µFaractère non-GpPRFUDWLTXH¶ RI WKH 6SDQLVK
JRYHUQPHQW DV µHQ FRQWUDGLFWLRQ DYHF OHV SULQFLSHV IRQGDPHQWDX[ GH OD
&RPPXQDXWp¶23   
The EP directly questioned the position of the Commission and the Council on 
the place of democracy within the EC ± and both were caught wrong-footed by this 
PRYH7KH&RXQFLO¶VZULWWHQUHSO\VLPSO\VWDWHGWKDWLWZDVIRUWKHWLPHEHLQJXQDEOH
to provide an answer. Commissioner Jean Rey, responsible for external relations, 
provided a rather vague reply during the debate of 29 March: while stating that the 
preoccupations of Parliament were important and that the Commission had debated the 
%LUNHOEDFK UHSRUW ZLWK LQWHUHVW DQG DLPHG WR GHYLVH VRPH µJHQHUDO SULQFLSOHV¶ RQ
DVVRFLDWLRQDQGHQODUJHPHQWWKDWZRXOGHQMR\3DUOLDPHQW¶VFRQVHQt, he would not go 
DQ\IXUWKHULQKLVDVVHVVPHQWRI6SDLQ¶VSROLWLFDOHOLJLELOLW\24.  At the same time, EC 
Member States were also grappling with the request: while Germany and France 
seemed more open to the possibility, the reaction of the Benelux countries was a more 
µIURVW\¶RQH25 6SDLQ¶VUHTXHVWGLGLQGHHGUDLVHVRPHIXQGDPHQWDOSROLWLFDOTXHVWLRQV
about the identity of the Community and its values.26 Such concerns were not limited 
to Community actors and the governments of the Member States, but were also 
considered pressing by trade unions and transnational political movements.27 In fact, 
WKH(3VHUYHGDVWKHPDLQFRQGXLWLQWRWKH(XURSHDQ&RPPXQLW\¶VLQVWLWXWLRQDOV\VWHP
of concerns that existed quite widely within European society. Eventually, this first 
Spanish attempt came to naught, but the ripples caused by this initial debate on political 
values continued to reverberate.   
 
*UHHFH¶VFRXSDQGWKHUHDIILUPDWLRQRIWKH(&¶VGHPRFUDWLFSULQFLSOH 
The debate on the role of democracy within the political identity of the Community 
FDPHEDFNWRWKHIRUHLQZKHQWKH&RORQHOV¶FRXSLQ*UHHFHJDYHULVHWRDQHZ
problem: how was the Community to react to such a crisis in the first European state 
to have signed an Association agreement with the EEC28, which was uniquely 
privileged in comparison with later agreements as it had been specifically designed to 
lead to full membership.29  
A military coup in Greece, the first associate member and the perceived cradle 
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of democracy, rekindled the debate on the ComPXQLW\¶V VWDQFH RQ LVVXHV RI
GHPRFUDF\2Q0D\(GRDUGR0DUWLQRFKDLUPDQRIWKH(3¶V3ROLWLFDO$IIDLUV
&RPPLWWHH DGGUHVVHG DQ RUDO TXHVWLRQ WR WKH &RXQFLO H[SUHVVLQJ WKH FRPPLWWHH¶V
anxiety about the suspension of civil and political rights in Greece and its 
incompatibility with the principles at the basis of the Community, which also formed 
the basis of the Association agreement. He also affirmed that Parliament considered 
LWVHOIWKHµGHPRFUDWLFJXDUDQWRU¶RIIUHHGRPLQ(XURSHDQGWKDWLWZRXOGGo everything 
in its power to facilitate the return of democratic legality in Greece.30 In the ensuing 
debate, Dutch Christian Democrat Wilhelmus Schuijt explicitly asked for the freezing 
of the association agreement with Greece until parliamentary democracy was 
restored.31 He justified this request by referring to the political nature of the 
Association agreement with Greece, claiming that the joint parliamentary commission 
between the European Parliament and the Greek Parliament represented the 
embodiment of this political relationship. Based on this understanding of the 
Association agreement as a political one, Schuijt argued that the suspension of the 
powers of the Greek parliament by the military regime and the consequent suspension 
of the joint commission denied the nature of the agreement: depriving the Greek 
parliament of its crucial role as the representative of the people also deprived the 
$VVRFLDWLRQ DJUHHPHQWRI LWV µPRVW LPSRUWDQW SROLWLFDO HOHPHQW¶32 Fellow speakers 
from the Socialist and Liberal groups echoed these sentiments.33 :KLOH 6SDLQ¶V
potential accession was only a hypothetical possibility in 1962, the EC-Greece 
Association agreement established clear institutional and legal links, which the 
dictatorial regime now threatened. It also was a clear precursor to full membership for 
Greece, and the EP asking for the Agreement to be suspended showed once again the 
cross-party consensus on the idea of democracy as a condition for membership. 34 
Initially, the Commission and the Council both gave cautious responses to the 
3DUOLDPHQW¶VSUHVVXUHV7KHGLIIHUHQFHVOLNHO\UHIOHFWHGWKHGLYHUVHQDWXUHRIWKHWKUHH
institutions involved ± as the EP took an immediate and clear stance against the regime 
in public, behind closed doors the debates in the Commission and Council showed the 
warring opinions and concerns harboured by the Member States. There was immense 
pressure within the circles of the Commission, as many worried that a failure to take 
a clear stance on the question would be interpreted as support for the new regime.35 
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Meanwhile, on 5 June 1967, the Council could not even reach a consensus on issuing 
a declaration on the establishment of the Greek dictatorship, deciding that a prudent 
stance of wait and see was the most suitable course of action. However, France and 
:HVW *HUPDQ\ RSSRVHG DQ\ RSHQ FRQGHPQDWLRQ RI WKH &RORQHOV¶ UHJLPH 7KH\
underlined the strategic importance of Greece for NATO following the Soviet 
penetration in the Mediterranean ± thus highlighting the wider geopolitical 
repercussions on the Cold War chessboard.36  
In the case of the Greek junta, the Council had manifested the innate 
FRQWUDGLFWLRQZKLFKFKDUDFWHUL]HGWKH(&¶VGHDOLQJVZLWKWKLUGSDUWLHVLWVUKHWRULFRQ
human rights and democratization was repeatedly undermined by the strategic and 
economic interests of its Member States, thereby providing the Greek regime some ± 
albeit limited ± room for manoeuvre.37 In their authoritative works on French and 
German policies towards the Greek dictatorship, Plassmann and Pelt respectively have 
documented the close relationships that both countries maintained with the dictatorial 
regime, in supply of military equipment and financial assistance.38 There was no 
coordination of bilateral and multilateral relations towards Greece. At the same time 
as the EC was moving to freeze the association, France was furnishing the junta with 
arms in its effort to create a third pole in the Mediterranean while West Germany, 
*UHHFH¶VVHFRQGODUJHVWVXSSOLHURIDUPVDQGWKH86¶VFORVHVWDOO\YLV-à-vis Athens, 
adopted a very lenient policy.39  
While the Council grappled with these difficulties, new Commission President 
Jean Rey was pressed by German Socialist Ludwig Metzger to clarify the 
&RPPLVVLRQ¶VSRVLWLon during a parliamentary debate in September 1967. Rey stated 
that, while it would maintain the daily management of the agreement, the Community 
would not negotiate on new issues (agricultural harmonisation and a new financial 
agreement) as originally envisaged,40 µXQWLO WKH GHPRFUDWLF DQG SDUOLDPHQWDU\
VWUXFWXUHV DUH UHVWRUHG LQ *UHHFH¶41 7KH &RPPXQLW\¶V ILQDQFLDO DLG ZDV DOVR
suspended. Only 69 of the 125 million dollars worth of credit made available to 
Greece under the first financial protocol had been used up.  
Thus, while the initial reactions to the Greek developments of the EP, 
Commission, and Council were very different, the three did to some extent converge 
toward a similar stance on the issue. In fact, a Commission paper stated that three 
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factors made it necessary to take a clear position: firstly, the worsening of the 
domestic situation in Greece; secondly, the totalitarian tendencies of the new regime; 
thirdly, the stances taken by the different European governments and the unequivocal 
position oI WKH &RXQFLO¶V FRQVXOWDWLYH DVVHPEO\ ZKLFK UHLQIRUFHG WKH WKHVLV SXW
forward by the EP.42   
 Most studies so far have reached a negative verdict in term of concrete impact 
of the freezing of the Association agreement.43 Nonetheless, its symbolic impact 
combined could not be ignored: even the dictators were troubled by the blow dealt by 
WKH((&GHFLVLRQWRWKHUHJLPH¶VOHJLWLPDF\DQGWULHGWROLIWWKHIUHH]HE\WKUHDWHQLQJ
the European Commission with legal action while, at the same time, trying to dispel 
perceptions that they were diplomatically isolated. In refusing to reconsider the 
suspension of the Association, the EC was demonstrating that a lack of democracy was, 
and would be, the principal hurdle to any further integration.44 This also contrasted with 
the position of the US and NATO, widely perceived to be indifferent or even tolerant 
of the new Greek regime.45 As Greece emerged from the dictatorship years later, this 
perceived contrast would play an important role in the transition strategy of the 
counWU\¶VSROLWLFDOHOLWH$SDUDOOHOUHVSRQVHIURPWKH&R(OHGWKH*UHHNVWRZLWKGUDZ
before a vote could sanction their exclusion in 1969. Thus, in the eyes of the Greeks, 
the EC and the CoE were the two organisations that had, at least symbolically, 
denounced the dictatorship - unlike the transatlantic allies.46 Similarly, taking this 
stance proved important for the EC itself: the debates and even disagreements in the 
(3WKH&RPPLVVLRQDQGWKH&RXQFLORYHU*UHHFH¶V$VVRFLDWLRQHQKDQFHGWKHLGHDRI
the European Community as a community of values with both the right and the duty to 
uphold democracy within the European continent ± no matter that this may have been 
an unintended consequence.  
 
The EC as the promoter and guarantor of European democracy  
In the 1970s, as the dictatorships of Greece, Spain and Portugal collapsed and the three 
countries set their sights on EC membership, the Community no longer merely intended 
democracy as a requirement prior to accession: in addition, it set itself up as a µJXDUDQWRU
RIGHPRFUDF\¶,QWKHGLVFRXUVHRIWKHDSSOLFDQWVDQGLQWKDWRIWKH(&HQODUJHPHQW
was identified as a way of anchoring the new Mediterranean democracies to democratic 
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Western Europe.47 Many historical studies of the applicant states show that they 
themselves interpreted accession to the EC as a confirmation of their successful 
WUDQVLWLRQ WR GHPRFUDF\ DQG DQ RIILFLDO DFFHSWDQFH EDFN LQWR WKH IROG RI WKH µWUXH¶
Europe.48 Tsoukalis shows how there was a widespread consensus among the Spanish 
political elites and the population at large, on EC membership as a way of stabilising 
the volatile political situation49 while in Greece the pro-membership elite saw 
membership as a way to consolidate democracy, referring to the freezing of the 
Association agreePHQW DQG WKH (&¶V GHQXQFLDWLRQ RI *UHHFH¶V PLOLWDU\ UHJLPH WR
support this argument.50 0RUHRYHU WKH &RPPXQLW\¶V IRFXV RQ GHPRFUDF\ VWRRG LQ
marked contrast with the attitude of NATO and the US, who had not denounced the 
dictatorship in the same way.51 This strengthened the claim that by joining the 
Community, Greece would be joining a pole of democracy. Historian Ricardo Martìn 
De la Guardia also identifies Spanish motivations for entry with the consensus between 
Spanish political and social forces on the necessity of European integration to engineer 
the socio-economic modernisation and full democratisation of the country after the 
FROODSVHRI)UDQFR¶VGLFWDWRUVKLS52 
Such perceptions of the EC as a champion of democracy in the eyes of the 
applicants makes it all the more compelling to ask why this also became a crucial 
concept for the Community actors themselves. After all, the practical functioning of the 
EC was hardly a model of democratic practice: at the time of the Southern European 
applications, the European Parliament was not yet directly elected and talk of the 
democratic deficit was beginning to emerge. In 1973, the established democracies of 
the UK, Ireland, and Denmark joined the EC and introduced new voices with strong 
national democratic traditions in the Community arena, but few questions with regards 
to democratic practice within Community discussions were raised.53 However, the self-
image of the EC as a champion of democracy became a way of finding a new raison 
G¶HWUHDW D WLPHRIFULVLV54 in the early 1970s, the international economic structures 
established after the Second World War were in crisis with the collapse of the Bretton 
Woods system and the repeated Oil crises, while the geopolitical order was also being 
called into question by the Vietnam War, the multiple crises in the Middle East and the 
changing dynamics of superpower relations linked to detente. Within this unclear 
situation, the political developments in Southern Europe presented the EC a potentially 
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highly destabilising change on its immediate periphery. The general sense of 
LQWHUQDWLRQDOFULVLVZDVFRPSRXQGHGE\WKH&RPPXQLW\¶VRZQVHQVHRILQWHUQDOFULVLV
as initiatives such as the European Economic and Monetary Union unravelled and 
disagreements persisted about the economic and even institutional shortcomings of the 
EC. A new catalyst was needed if the EC itself was to find a new common direction. 
Ongoing discussions about the political nature of European integration and its 
democratic character presented an opportunity to find just such a rallying cry. At the 
same time, this internal quest took place as human rights emerged as a vital new element 
of the international political discourse, of which the Helsinki Act in 1975 was but one 
example.55 
 At the late-1973 Copenhagen Summit, there had been an attempt to give 
European integration a more explicitly political dimension with the Document on 
European Identity, presented by the Heads of State or Government of the nine Member 
States of the newly enlarged European Community: 
 
µVKDULQJDVWKH\GRWKHVDPHDWWLWXGHVWROLIHEDVHGRQDGHWHUPLQDWLRQWREXLOGDVRFLHW\ZKLFK
measures up to the needs of the individual, they are determined to defend the principles of 
representative democracy, of the rule of law, of social justice ² which is the ultimate goal of 
economic progress ² and of respect for human rights. All of these are fundamental elements 
RIWKH(XURSHDQ,GHQWLW\¶56  
 
The Southern European applications for membership, and in particular the first, lodged 
by Greece in June SUHVHQWHG WKH LGHDO RSSRUWXQLW\ WR UHILQH WKH(&¶V LGHQWLW\
beyond the rhetoric articulated in the previous decade, and the challenge of translating 
it into policy when faced with hard-edged economic and political considerations. 
 
The Greek Case: Converging Rhetoric 
7KHVXVSHQVLRQRIWKH$VVRFLDWLRQDJUHHPHQWWRWKHVWDWXVRIµFXUUHQWDGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶
after the coup, coupled with the forced withdrawal of Greece from the CoE in 1969 had 
contributed to the erosion of domestic approval for the junta and frustrated the attempts 
of the dictators to gain support from important European political elites.57 In Greek 
eyes, the Community became associated with liberal democratic values, after the 
GHFLVLRQ WR IUHH]H WKH $VVRFLDWLRQ FUHDWHG  µDQ LQWHUHVWLQJ SKHQRPHQon where the 
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process of European integration was identified with the defence of democratic 
YDOXHV¶58 7KLVKHOSHG*UHHFH¶VOHDGHUGXULQJWKHWUDQVLWLRQ.RQVWDQWLQRV.DUDPDQOLV
WR XVH WKH (& OLQN WR SRVLWLYHO\ LQIOXHQFH *UHHFH¶V SROLWLFDO WUDMHFWRU\ DQG LWs 
international positioning by reintroducing Greece into the Western family of 
democracies.59  
The positive view of the EC was important when confronted with the strong anti-
Americanism that permeated Greek public opinion during and after the dictatorship, 
derived from the perceived US failure to oppose, or even silent support of, the junta.60 
This sentiment reached its height with the double Turkish invasion of Cyprus and the 
SHUFHLYHGODFNRIUHDFWLRQIURPWKH86DQG1$72ZKLFKOHGWR*UHHFH¶VZLWKGUDZDO
from the military wing of the transatlantic alliance. Karamanlis would later comment 
WKDWµWKHZLWKGUDZDOIURP1$72ZDVQRWRQO\MXVWLILHGEXWQHFHVVDU\7KHIXU\RIWKH
Greek and Cypriot people was so great at that time that the only alternative would have 
EHHQZDU¶61  In this climate of volatile and heightened public sentiment, the Greek 
perception of the Community as the symbol of liberal democratic values presented a 
vital option to Greek policy-makers during transition - compounding the longstanding 
choice to move closer to the EC already made with the Association agreement in 
1958.62  
7KH (&¶V UHVSRQVH WR *UHHFH¶V DSSOLFDWLRQ ZDV PL[HG LI QRW LQ SXEOLF WKHQ
certainly behind closed doors. The Commission and the Member States were fully 
aware of the largely political reasons that had guided the Greek request; although 
positive in their official response, they were much less enthusiastic in private, given the 
VHULRXVSROLWLFDODQGHFRQRPLFLPSOLFDWLRQVRIDSRVVLEOHDFFHVVLRQ7KH&RPPLVVLRQ¶V
Opinion, published on 28 January 1976, understood fully the political importance of 
supporting the Greek application, but at the same time, it considered that enlargement 
called for speeding up the process of integration.63 The suggestion made of having a 
pre-accession period stemmed from several considerations.64 It presented an 
opportunity for the Community to reform its institutions and at the same time to develop 
a substantial programme for economic aid that would enable Greece to overcome its 
structural weaknesses aQG DGDSW PRUH HDVLO\ WR WKH &RPPXQLW\¶V REOLJDWLRQV DQG
mechanisms. Moreover, a preparatory period seemed to reflect the desire of some 
0HPEHU6WDWHVWRGHOD\*UHHFH¶VDFFHVVLRQZLWKRXWFDXVLQJDSROLWLFDOUHEXII 
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Despite the problems it had raised, the CRPPLVVLRQ¶V2SLQLRQFRQFOXGHGWKDWµLW
LVFOHDUWKDWWKHFRQVROLGDWLRQRI*UHHFH¶VGHPRFUDF\ZKLFKLVDIXQGDPHQWDOFRQFHUQ
not only of the Greek people but also of the Community and its Member States, is 
LQWLPDWHO\UHODWHGWRWKHHYROXWLRQRI*UHHFH¶VUHOationship with the Community. It is 
in the light of these considerations that the Commission recommends that a clear 
DIILUPDWLYHUHSO\EHJLYHQWRWKH*UHHNUHTXHVW¶65 Therefore, notwithstanding serious 
misgivings about the challenges of a Greek accession, the Commission concluded that 
democratic concerns overshadowed all others when it came to providing a rationale in 
favour of accepting the Greek application. Two weeks after it had been submitted, the 
&RXQFLO XQDQLPRXVO\ UHMHFWHG WKH &RPPLVVLRQ¶V 2SLQLRQ - an unprecedented and 
unexpected decision. At a press conference following the Council meeting, Gaston 
Thorn ± /X[HPERXUJ¶VSULPHPLQLVWHUVSHDNLQJRQEHKDOIRIWKH&RXQFLO± stated that 
µIRU WKH QLQH GHOHJDWLRQV WKHUH FRXOG EH QR WULDO SHULRG RU SROLWLFal considerations 
DWWDFKHG WR *UHHFH¶V DFFHVVLRQ¶66 Finally, after eight months of deliberations, the 
&RPPXQLW\KDGGHFLGHGWRRSHQQHJRWLDWLRQVIRU*UHHFH¶VSRWHQWLDOPHPEHUVKLS 
The promises that the Community had made to Greece when the Association 
agreement had been frozen and then when the dictatorship collapsed gave Karamanlis 
the opportunity to push for the argument that democratic obligations should trump 
economic concerns. In the face of this, the Community could do little else but be 
persuaded by the combined force of its own rhetoric and the Greek claims that only by 
being accepted into the EC fold would their transition succeed and avoid the potential 
destabilisation that a relapse into authoritarianism - or a detachment from the Western 
camp - would bring.67 
Underlying strategic imperatives lay at the root of the second enlargement: as the 
Southern European states emerged from the dictatorships and turned to the EC with the 
aim to become full members, the Community found itself in the position of having to 
respond to two interconnected problems. The first was to ensure that the transition to 
democracy remained on course; the second, that the international alignments on the 
Cold War game board remained at the very least unaltered by the regime changes.68 In 
formulating their response to these demands, the Community actors found that the 
principles voiced over the previous decade would provide them with the ideal means to 
bring Greece, and then Spain and Portugal into the Western European institutional fold.  
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 In order to meet these twin goals, the Community used the democratic norms it 
had been building up as its core political identity to justify enlargement: in doing so, it 
could reinforce its internal evolving self-perception, maintain the Southern European 
countries on the course of democracy and, crucially for the wider Cold War context, 
their alignment with Western Europe through participation in its political and economic 
institutions at a time when NATO was unable to bind them together. 
 
Democracy as the new binding principle of European integration 
*UHHFH¶V DSSURDFK SURYHG DOO WKH PRUH VXFFHVVIXO EHFDXVH LW UHVRQDWHG ZLWK WKH
&RPPXQLW\¶VSHUFHSWLRQRILWVHOIDQGKRZWKLVKDGHYROYHGGXULQJWKHV,QWHUQDO
talk focused not only on how to tackOH WKH&RPPXQLW\¶VHFRQRPLFDQG LQVWLWXWLRQDO
SUREOHPVEXWDOVRRQ LWV IXWXUH WUDMHFWRU\DQGRQ µGHILQLQJ(XURSH¶7KLV OHG WR WKH
attempt to give European integration a more explicitly political dimension with the 
December 1973 Document on European Identity69 followed in January 1976 by the 
7LQGHPDQV5HSRUWZKLFKDSSHDUHGMXVWDIHZGD\VEHIRUHWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶V2SLQLRQ
on Greece. In this document, Belgian Prime Minister Leo Tindemans sought to compile 
an overview of the EEC with the aim of setting out a common concept of a European 
Union.70 +LVUHSRUWVWDWHGWKDWWKH&RPPXQLW\µKDGORVWLWVJXLGLQJOLJKWQDPHO\WKH
political consensus between our countries on our reasons for undertaking the joint 
WDVN¶71 7KH &RPPXQLW\ KDG WR ILQG D QHZ UDLVRQ G¶rWUH LQ RUGer to push European 
integration forward, Tindemans argued. What had once been the key appeal - the 
pursuit of economic interdependence - was no longer sufficient, and in any case the 
general economic crisis did not make it likely that the Community would be able to 
make any significant economic advance. The other driving motive behind the Treaties 
of Rome, namely the pursuit of peace and stability in Western Europe, was considered 
attained by the 1970s. 
However, the advancement of democracy could offer the Community a new way 
forward.72 Thus, enlargement potentially offered the opportunity to shape the 
&RPPXQLW\¶V SROLWLFDO GLPHQVLRQ ,Q WKH ZRUGV RI :HVW *HUPDQ )RUHLJQ 0LQLVWHU
Hans-Dietrich Genscher the decision to welcome the poor southern countries showed 
WKDWµ(XURSHKDGHPHUJHGIURPWKHVWDJHRIDQHFRQRPLFFRPPXQLW\ WRGD\EHLQJD
SROLWLFDO FRPPXQLW\¶73 Such sentiments were echoed in the communiqués of the 
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recently formed European Council, which identified the process of European 
integration with the defence of democratic values.74 
Thus the central legitimating strategy that had originally moved the project of 
European integration forward, that of promoting peace, found its complement in the 
&RPPXQLW\¶VQHZREOLJDWLRQWRSURPRWHGHPRFUDWLFLGHDOV75 Thus GUHHFH¶VUHTXHVWWR
enter the EC as a means of strengthening its own nascent democracy resonated with the 
&RPPXQLW\¶VHIIRUWVWRSURPRWHLWVHOIDVDSURWHFWRURIGHPRFUDF\,QWKH*UHHNFDVH
WKH GLVFXVVLRQV RYHU HQODUJHPHQW DIIHFWHG WKH ((&¶V VHOI-image while, in turn, this 
evolving self-image positively influenced the attitudes of the existing Member States 
towards Greece. This created a sort of reciprocal relationship which meant that the 
manner in which the Nine responded to the Greek application would be the test-case 
IRUWKH&RPPXQLW\¶VRZQFUHGLELOLW\LQIRUPXODWLQJDSROLF\WKDWZDVFRQVLVWHQWZLWK
its newly self-SURFODLPHGLGHQWLW\7KH&RPPXQLW\¶VGLVFXVVLRQVRYHU*UHHNDFFHVVLRQ
gave concrete form to the internal discussions over the norms of liberal democracy.  
7KHIDFWWKDW*UHHFHZDVZLGHO\SHUFHLYHGWREHWKHµFUDGOHRIGHPRFUDF\¶RQO\
served to strengthen the process. The French President, for instance, eventually 
GHVFULEHG*UHHFH¶VHQWU\DVDµUHWXUQWRWKHURRWV¶76 DQGZURWHLQKLVPHPRLUVWKDWµLW
ZDVLPSRVVLEOHWRH[FOXGH*UHHFHWKHPRWKHURIDOOGHPRFUDFLHVIURP(XURSH¶77 The 
discourse on the Greek application thus played a direct part in the contemporary debate 
within the Community on identity.78 Moreover, acceSWLQJ*UHHFH¶VDSSOLFDWLRQPDGHLW
all the more difficult for the EC to deny the same request from Spain and Portugal in 
1977, provided they also continued along the path of democratization.  
The discussions of enlargement to the Southern European countries provided the 
HVVHQWLDOFRQWH[WIRUWKH1LQH¶VLGHDRIVXEVFULELQJWRDDeclaration on Democracy in 
1978. Since all three southern Mediterranean applicants contended that Community 
membership would help them to consolidate their infant democracies, it seemed 
reasonable to seize the opportunity to make a declaration on the fundamental principles 
on which the Community was based. Moreover, the decision to hold the first direct 
elections to the European Parliament in 1979 increased pressure on the need to find a 
ZD\WR µHVWDEOLVKD OLQNEHWZHHQ WKHSUDFWLFHRISOXUDOLVWLFSDUOLDPHQWDU\GHPRFUDF\
DQGPHPEHUVKLSRIWKH&RPPXQLW\¶79 
7KH DLP ZDV WR SXW FOHDUO\ RQ WKH UHFRUG WKH &RPPXQLW\¶V FRPPLWPHQW WR
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democratic principles which could then be echoed in the Acts of Accession of each new 
Member State. The European Council meeting of December 1977, however, rejected 
the idea of incorporating such a declaration in the preamble of the eventual accession 
treaties80 and concluded that the Declaration would be sufficient in itself, as it would 
form part of the acquis to which acceding states would have to subscribe.81 The most 
important thing was to find an appropriate moment to implement it without raising 
suspicions.82 
 In the end, the Declaration on Democracy was adopted at the European Council 
of 7±8 April 1978 and coincided with the announcement of the date for the first direct 
elections of the European Parliament. The text of the declaration drew heavily on the 
1973 Declaration on the European Identity and it also included references to the 
&RPPXQLW\¶V Joint Declaration on Fundamental Rights adopted under the UK 
Presidency on 5 April 1977. The most important breakthrough was the inclusion of a 
ILQDO SDUDJUDSK ZKHUH WKH 1LQH GHFODUHG µWKDW UHVSHFW IRU DQG PDLQWHQDQFH RI
representative democracy and human rights in each Member State are indispensable for 
PHPEHUVKLSRIWKH(XURSHDQ&RPPXQLWLHV¶83 Ultimately, the Nine had little desire to 
give more specific definitions of democracy: democratic practice varied considerably 
amongst the Nine and any attempt to define a set of clear democratic norms was likely 
to encounter strongly divergent opinions and lead to disagreement. The Declaration on 
Democracy was thus an effective way of formally tying the ideas that had been 
developed over the previous two decades with the process of enlargement to southern 
Europe: it formally set democratic principles as the basis for a shared political identity, 
which the new members would have to accept as part of the acquis. 
 The 1980s would see the EC focus on other issues, as the Single European Act 
was dedicated to institutional reform and moving forward towards a common market. 
<HWWKHLGHDRIGHPRFUDF\UHPDLQHGDWWKHKHDUWRIWKH(&¶VLGHQWLW\DQGE\WKHHQGRI
the decade the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the unravelling of the Cold War 
framework brought it back into the limelight in full force. The breakdown of the 
&RPPXQLVW UHJLPHV LQ &HQWUDO DQG (DVWHUQ (XURSH DQG WKHVH FRXQWULHV¶ GHPDQG WR
µUHMRLQ (XURSH¶ YLD &RPPXQLW\ PHPEHUVKLS FRXSOHd with German re-unification, 
presented the EU with the need to institutionalise the key tenets of its political identity, 
which were formalised into the Copenhagen criteria in 1993.84 The biggest challenge 
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of the 1990s was to apply these criteria to the EU¶VUHODWLRQVKLSZLWKWKH&HQWUDODQG
Eastern European countries which, following more or less successful transitions to 
democracy, were queuing up for membership.  
 
Conclusion 
7KH HYROXWLRQ RI WKH (&¶V GHPRFUDWLF WUDGLWLRQ ZDV KDUGO\ OLQHDU DQG LW ZRXOG Ee 
inaccurate to suggest that the course followed ± uneven as it was ± would inescapably 
lead to the formal constitutionalisation of democratic values in the 1993 Copenhagen 
criteria. Nonetheless, the different institutions of the Community developed a discourse 
of political identity in the 1960s and 1970s, introducing the idea of the Community as 
a political entity based on shared values, and then articulating these values around the 
concept of democracy in a way that became significant not merely as a means of self-
identification, but also as a framework within which policies had to be formulated. The 
SURVSHFWRIHQODUJHPHQWVHUYHGDVDFDWDO\VWIRUWKHLGHQWLILFDWLRQRIWKH&RPPXQLW\¶V
mission and goals. As Spain, Greece, and Portugal underwent momentous political 
change, their leaders turned expectant eyes to the EC, clearly demanding a political 
response. This, in turn, called for a definition of the shared political values binding the 
&RPPXQLW\ WRJHWKHU ,Q WKLV ZD\ µHQWDQJOHG H[FKDQJHV¶ EHWZHHQ WKH (& and the 
Spanish, Greek, and Portuguese states in the early southern enlargement process 
provided the original impetus for enhancing the idea of the EC as a community of values 
with both the right and the duty to uphold democracy within the European continent. 
On this basis, different actors within the EC came to identify democracy as a 
fundamental requirement for membership of the Community ± starting with MEPs, who 
managed to turn the existence of their at the time near-powerless institution into a 
symbol RI WKH &RPPXQLW\¶V FRPPLWPHQW WR GHPRFUDF\ 2QFH WKH LGHD KDG EHHQ
introduced into the public discourse, it became very difficult for the Council and the 
Commission to escape it.  
 Through subsequent re-interpretations of the Treaties of Rome, and in particular 
LWV3UHDPEOHDGKHUHQFHWRGHPRFUDWLFSULQFLSOHVLQDFRXQWU\¶VJRYHUQLQJLQVWLWXWLRQV
was first introduced as a requirement for any country seeking Community membership, 
as a means to preserve the allegiance to the fundamental political values shared by all 
Member States. This criterion, even if not formally enshrined in law, bestowed upon 
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the Community the role of guarantor of the democratic commitment and practice of its 
Member States ± thus providing an anchor for the democratic transitions of Greece, 
Spain, and Portugal away from dictatorship. Finally, the 1978 Declaration on 
Democracy made the commitment to democratic values part of the acquis, and the ideas 
of political identity of the Community that had developed in the meeting between the 
EC and its southern neighbours as a part of an enlargement process were formalised.85  
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